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ABSTRACT 
India’s primary method for security cooperation in Southeast Asia is through 
maritime engagement, predominantly through naval exercises, port visits, and capacity 
development with partner navies. This thesis examined why and how this maritime 
cooperation has increased since the implementation of the Act East Policy. The research 
used two approaches to identify and understand India’s maritime engagement. First, a 
quantitative approach measured naval exercises and port visits from 2013 to 2018 
and found that India has increased its maritime cooperation with Myanmar and 
Indonesia, which implies India’s interests in border security. It also revealed 
India’s lack of engagement with South China Sea claimant states, which suggests risk 
aversion to China. Second, the researcher used a framework to measure the scope and 
depth of maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries to 
explore India’s maritime engagement from 2015 to the end of 2018. Findings reveal an 
increase in both maritime security and capacity development initiatives between India 
and Indonesia, Myanmar, Singapore, and Vietnam. Both frameworks illustrate 
India’s increased maritime engagement in Southeast Asia, and show that the 
reasons for the increased cooperation are the desire of Southeast Asian countries 
for capacity development and India’s economic motivations since 2015. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In recent years, Indian maritime cooperation with Southeast Asian countries 
appears to have grown sharply. In Prime Minister Modi’s “Act East” Policy (AEP), the 
maritime component focusing on increased engagement in the Asia-Pacific region includes 
port visits, increased deployments, and maritime capacity building programs.1 
Furthermore, through large-scale multilateral exercises, such as MILAN, to high-end 
bilateral naval exercises, such as the Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise 
(SIMBEX), India’s maritime engagement with Southeast Asian countries exemplifies its 
strategy for further integration in the Asia-Pacific region.2 
This thesis compiles data on Indian maritime cooperation with Southeast Asian 
countries, identifies patterns in maritime activities and other examples of defense 
cooperation, and explains those patterns. The main question this thesis answers is, why has 
Indian security cooperation with certain Southeast Asian countries grown considerably 
during the last several years? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research is significant in three ways. First, this study aids in detailing the scope 
and depth of India’s security relationships with the Association of Southeast Asia Nations 
(ASEAN) and individual countries of Southeast Asia during the time since the AEP’s 
implementation. Second, this research contributes to understanding Indian and Southeast 
Asian countries’ motivations and implications for increased maritime cooperation. Third, 
this research is important for the U.S. strategies for the Indo-Pacific. Over the last several 
years, India has become a focal point in U.S. strategy. For the first time, the United States 
                                                 
1 Abhijit Singh, Nautical Dimension of India’s “Act East” Policy (Singapore: Nanyang Technological 
University, 2018), 3, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/PR180409_The-Nautical-
Dimension-of-Indias-Act-East-Policy.pdf.  
2 Singh, 3.  
2 
named the Indo-Pacific as a regional area of concern and ranked it above all other regions 
in the 2017 National Security Strategy.3 Washington views New Delhi as a fulcrum for 
providing regional security and with assisting to counterbalance China due to India’s naval 
capabilities and its proximity to Southeast Asia.4  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature pertinent to this thesis is divided into three parts. The first part 
establishes a consensus in the literature that maritime security cooperation between India 
and countries of Southeast Asia has increased over the past several years. The second part 
examines India’s motivations for increased maritime cooperation with Southeast Asia. The 
third and final part examines the motivations of countries of Southeast Asia for increased 
maritime cooperation with India. 
1. Increased Maritime Cooperation between India and Southeast Asia 
In support of the aims of this thesis, this research includes an examination of the 
growth in maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asia over the last several 
years along with an analysis of the different activities for maritime cooperation. It also 
creates a time frame to aid in an analysis of the growth in maritime cooperation between 
India and Southeast Asia. First, according to India’s maritime doctrine, maritime 
cooperative activities include “port visits, bilateral interactions, training initiatives, 
operational exercises, and technical support arrangements.”5 Second, as the AEP 
represents an important foreign policy instrument for India’s deepened endeavors with 
Southeast Asian countries, it is important to focus on the time frame surrounding the 
implementation when measuring growth. For that reason, this thesis used the time frame 
                                                 
3 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2017).  
4 Amit Gupta, “India’s Maritime Strategy: Aspirations and Reality,” in Naval Powers in the Indian 
Ocean and the Western Pacific, ed. Howard M. Hensel and Amit Gupta (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2018.  
5 Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime 
Security Strategy, Naval Strategic Publication 1.2 (New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of 
Defence (Navy), 2015), https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_ 
Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf.  
3 
from one year prior to the AEP announcement in 2013 to the end of the calendar year of 
2018 for measuring the growth regarding maritime cooperation. With regard this time 
frame, there is a broad consensus among scholars that maritime cooperation between India 
and Southeast Asia has grown over the last several years. Table 1 substantiates India’s 
growing maritime presence and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific regions. The four countries 
India visited in 2013 were all to Southeast Asian countries.6 India visited seven Southeast 
Asian countries in 2015 and 2016, and nine Southeast Asian countries in 2017.7 
Table 1. Indian Navy Deployments to Asia Pacific Countries from 
2013–20178 
Year No. of Deployments 
No. of Asia-Pacific 
Countries Visited No. of Ships 
2013 1 4 4 
2014 4 7 6 
2015 4 9 7 
2016 6 17 15 
2017 6 17 17 
 
India’s bilateral relations with Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia best illustrate 
India and countries of Southeast Asia’s growing maritime cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Harsh V. Pant and Abhijit Singh agree that maritime cooperation between India 
                                                 
6 Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2013–14 (New Delhi: Ministry of 
Defence, 2013), https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport2013-14-ENG.pdf.  
7 Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2015–2016 (New Delhi: Ministry of 
Defence, 2015), https://mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/Annual2016.pdf; Ministry of Defence, 
Government of India, Annual Report 2016–17 (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, 2016), 
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport1617.pdf; Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 
Annual Report 2017–18 (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, 2015), 
https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Annualreport1718.pdf.  
8 Adapted from Singh, Nautical Dimension.  
4 
and Vietnam is a focal area of their overall security partnership.9 Since 2013, India has 
increased its maritime ties with Vietnam. For example, in 2016, India offered a credit line 
of $500 million to Vietnam to modernize its frigates as well as to purchase approximately 
a dozen patrol boats.10 Also in 2016, the first round of Vietnamese submariners finished a 
long course in India in which sailors were trained to operate and maintain Vietnam’s 
procurement of six Kilo-class submarines.11 India is also predicted to sell BrahMos anti-
ship cruise missiles to Vietnam in the near future, thereby drastically increasing Vietnam’s 
maritime defense capabilities.12 In return, Vietnam will permit India to have access to the 
port in Nha Trang, which is strategically significant owing to its proximity to the Cam 
Ranh Bay.13 Cam Ranh Bay is of strategic importance due to its deep waters and position 
between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. 
Abhijit Singh states that because the SIMBEX represents the Indian navy’s most 
prolific naval engagement in Southeast Asia, India’s closest maritime partner is 
Singapore.14 India and Singapore consistently try to deepen their maritime ties by 
renewing agreements and expanding existent exercises. In 2017, the long-standing 
SIMBEX went beyond traditional antisubmarine exercises by including advanced 
exercises in air defense, live-firings, and other advanced naval warfare exercises.15 As of 
July 2018, Singapore and India have signed an additional bilateral logistics agreement, 
                                                 
9 Singh, Nautical Dimension; Harsh V. Pant, India and Vietnam: A “Strategic Partnership” in the 
Making (Singapore: RSiS and Nanyang Technological University, 2018), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/PB180409_-India-and-Vietnam.pdf.  
10 Singh, Nautical Dimension, 6.  
11 Sandeep Unnithan, “Why India Needs to Ramp Up Its Token Training of Vietnamese 
Submariners,” Daily O, September 3, 2016, http://www.dailyo.in/politics/modi-vietnam-submarines-
indiannavy-vietnames-peoples-navy/story/1/12726.html.   
12 Pant, India and Vietnam.  
13 Pant.  
14 Singh, Nautical Dimension, 6.  
15 Singh, 6.  
5 
which allows India to use Changi Naval Base.16 This access increases India’s operational 
reach in Southeast Asia. 
Utham Jamadhagni states, “India’s first-ever naval exercise outside the 
Commonwealth was with Indonesia.”17 Since 2002, India and Indonesia have conducted 
coordinated patrol exercises twice a year; in 2014, they began expanding the exercises to a 
more robust naval exercise and include other countries.18 In May 2018, Indonesia and India 
stepped up their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership wherein India agreed 
to develop Sabang, a western port in Indonesia.19 
India’s maritime cooperation with Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia indicates that 
cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries is in fact growing. Although the 
scope and depth of maritime cooperation between India and each country varies, the trends 
in increased exercises, naval capacity building programs, and naval dialogues between 
India and Southeast Asia indicate that the maritime cooperation is on the rise. 
2. India’s Motivations for Increased Maritime Cooperation 
Most analysts believe that India’s increasing presence in Southeast Asia can be best 
explained by a combination of economic and strategic drivers. These two factors bolster 
India’s drive for increased engagement with the countries of Southeast Asia. This section 
is divided into two subsections. The first subsection discusses India’s economic 
motivations and how these motivations are related to maritime cooperation, and the second 
                                                 
16 Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, “Navy Gets Access to Singapore’s Changi Naval Base,” Economic 
Times, July 12, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/navy-gets-access-to-singapores-
changi-naval-base/articleshow/61855776.cms.  
17 Utham Jamadhagni, “India-Southeast Asia Maritime Cooperation: Now and After,” in India and 
Southeast Asia: Strategic Convergence in the Twenty-First Century, ed. T. Nirmala Devi and Adluri 
Subramanyam Raju, 265–281 (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2012).  
18 S. Anandan, “India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol Graduates into Joint Exercise,” Hindu, February 
6, 2014, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indiaindonesia-coordinated-patrol-graduates-into-joint-
exercise/article5661161.ece.  
19 Linda Yulisman, “Indonesia, India Agree to Step up Cooperation in Defence and Other Key Areas,” 
Straits Times, June 1, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-india-agree-to-step-up-
cooperation-in-defence-and-other-key-areas.  
6 
subsection discusses India’s aspiration to expand its strategic role in Southeast Asia in the 
context of Sino-Indo rivalry. 
a. The Economic Dimension 
The importance of trade to India is evident, and it is directly tied to the maritime 
domain. According to the Indian Ministry of Shipping, “around 95% of India’s trading by 
volume and 70% by value is done through maritime transport.”20 Notably, 40 percent of 
that trade flows through the Strait of Malacca.21 Therefore, it is not surprising that India’s 
maritime doctrine heavily emphasizes trade. Its maritime doctrine attaches trade to safety 
and security of the international shipping lanes, sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), and 
exclusive economic zones.22 Because of Indian maritime doctrine’s explicit articulation 
concerning the importance of safeguarding India’s trade linkages, its motivations for 
increased maritime cooperation are undoubtedly reinforced. 
Numerous authors, such as Arabinda Acharya, argue that nonconventional and 
conventional security threats in the Strait of Malacca drive greater demand for maritime 
security for India in Southeast Asia.23 India’s maritime doctrine strongly addresses 
terrorism and piracy threats in the Strait of Malacca. Any disruption in the Strait of Malacca 
would have detrimental ramifications not only to India but also of world shipping 
schedules.24 India generally exhibits sensitivity to the littoral states with claims in the Strait 
of Malacca when offering maritime security, and it is often requested to not interfere.25 
Even so, by requesting to participate in joint exercises, India has consistently voiced its 
                                                 
20 “Shipping Industry and Ports in India,” India Brand Equity Foundation, IBEF, accessed September 
13, 2018, https://www.ibef.org/industry/ports-india-shipping.aspx.  
21 Howard M. Hensel and Amit Gupta, eds., Naval Powers in the Indian Ocean and the Western 
Pacific (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2018), 185.  
22 Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), Ensuring Secure Seas.  
23 Amitav Acharya, East of India, South of China: Sino-Indian Encounters in Southeast Asia (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2017).  
24 Jamadhagni, “India-Southeast Asia Maritime Cooperation,” 266.  
25 Jamadhagni, 273.  
7 
desire to have a role in securing the strait. Additionally, India’s push for a role in maritime 
security in the Strait of Malacca with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore demonstrates the 
importance it places on safeguarding trade. 
Recent literature from several scholars have pointed out efforts of India and 
Southeast Asian countries toward developing “blue economy” cooperative partnerships 
separate from safeguarding their trade in the Strait of Malacca. The term blue economy 
does not have a universal definition but rather fits specific countries’ context.26 In the 
ASEAN-India context, for example, the goal of the blue economy is to strengthen 
collaboration to prevent illegal fishing, increase exchanges of technical data to improve 
maritime sustainability, enhance commerce and transportation, create jobs, and promote 
security.27 Over the last two years, India and ASEAN have held workshops on initiating 
this blue economy partnership.28 The 2018 blue economy workshop between India and 
ASEAN directly tied economics and maritime security in a singular framework for 
maritime cooperation.29 This development has already produced bilateral blue economy 
agreements and stands as a benign approach to enhancing maritime security. 
b. The Strategic Dimension 
David Brewster notes that Singapore and the United States are strong advocates for 
India taking on a greater role in balancing Southeast Asian countries against China.30 
According to Brewster, despite pressures to take on this role, India has no clear strategy 
for assuming a balancing role other than deepening select military-to-military 
                                                 
26 Voyer et al., “Maritime Security and the Blue Economy: Intersections and Interdependencies in the 
Indian Ocean,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 14, no. 1 (2018): 28–48, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2018.1418155.    
27 VNA, “Second ASEAN-India Workshop on Blue Economy Held,” Vietnam +, June 18, 2018, 
https://en.vietnamplus.vn/second-aseanindia-workshop-on-blue-economy-held/134893.vnp.  
28 VNA, “Second ASEAN-India Workshop.”  
29 VNA.  
30 David Brewster, “India’s Defense Strategy and the India-ASEAN Relationship,” India Review 12, 
no. 3 (2013): 151–164, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2013.820987.  
8 
relationships, specifically through expanding naval cooperation. Amitav Acharya also 
agrees that India’s balancing strategy is through increased cooperation.31 The Indian navy 
is expanding its relationships with other countries as illustrated by its encouraging periodic 
defense dialogues, ship visits, and regular naval exercises and patrols.32 Along with 
deepening its partnerships, India’s robust advocation for international maritime law norms 
shows its commitment to restore strategic balance in the Asian waters through focusing on 
international laws.33 Indian analysts claim that Chinese aggression in the South China Sea 
has created a power imbalance between India and China in the Asian waters through 
China’s grip over the Spratly Islands; these islands enable China to project its naval power 
into South Asian waters.34 James Russell and Daniel Moran state that China’s naval 
facilities in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Maldives, Pakistan, and Oman are major 
points of friction between India and China.35 Therefore, the Chinese expansionism threat 
is shared in both Southeast Asian countries and waters. Overall, China’s actions in 
Southeast Asia have prompted an increased maritime response from India. 
3. Southeast Asia’s Motivations for Increased Maritime Cooperation 
The motivations of countries in Southeast Asia for increased maritime cooperation 
with India are represented from two viewpoints. The first viewpoint is the institutional 
viewpoint (ASEAN), and the second is representative of the individual countries that make 
up Southeast Asia. Therefore, the motivations for increased maritime cooperation with 
India vary depending on the viewpoint. The following subsections address the different 
viewpoints on increased maritime cooperation with India.  
                                                 
31 Acharya, East of India, 155.  
32 Brewster, “India’s Defense Strategy,” 158.  
33 Singh, Nautical Dimension, 4.  
34 Singh, 4.  
35 Daniel Moran and James Russell, eds., Maritime Strategy and Global Order: Markets, Resources, 
Security (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 201.  
9 
a. ASEAN’s Motivations for Increased Maritime Cooperation 
The Southeast Asian waters are rich in resources and comprise vital SLOCs and 
international shipping lanes that are of high importance to many countries. Consequently, 
high-level disputes such as those over oil exploration and Chinese military expansionism 
have heightened instability in this region. ASEAN’s strategy for dealing with this 
instability primarily occurs at a dialogue level by holding workshops and meetings to 
discuss the maritime security front.36 Specifically, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and 
the ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting (ADMM) and the ASEAN Defense Minister 
Meeting Plus (ADMM+) hold periodic meetings where maritime security is generally on 
the top of the list for discussion.37 Acharya states that ASEAN’s original motive for 
inviting India into the ARF was partially because of the role India can play in 
counterbalancing China.38 More recently, he also asserted that ASEAN’s inclusion of both 
China and India is aimed at maintaining regional order.39 ASEAN-India’s initiatives for 
developing blue economy cooperative relationships is indicative of ASEAN’s benign 
method for increasing maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia and beyond. Whereas there 
is increasing literature concerning India’s motivations for a cooperative ASEAN-India blue 
economy partnership, such as Padmaja’s article on Modi’s maritime diplomacy,40 
literature on ASEAN-Sino blue economy initiatives are scarce. 
  
                                                 
36 Anushree Bhattacharyya, “Understanding Security in Regionalism Framework: ASEAN Maritime 
Security in Perspective,” Maritime Affairs 6, no. 2 (2010): 72–89, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09733159.2010.559786.   
37 Bhattacharyya, “Understanding Security,” 72–89.   
38 Acharya, East of India, 161.  
39 Acharya, 173.   
40 G. Padmaja, “Modi’s Maritime Diplomacy: A Strategic Opportunity,” Maritime Affairs 11, no. 2 
(2015): 25–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/09733159.2015.1112053.  
10 
b. Individual Country Motivations for Increased Maritime Cooperation 
In general, individual members of ASEAN regard the institution’s goals of 
preserving a peaceful stable environment in Southeast Asia as a key part of their own 
national strategies.41 However, the individual countries of Southeast Asia face their own 
problems, which are reflected in their foreign policies. Table 2 provides a snapshot of the 
motivations of individual countries for increased maritime cooperation with India. 
Table 2. Primary Motivations of Southeast Asian Countries for 
Naval Cooperation with India42 
Country Primary Motivations 
Brunei Defense capabilities development, naval training, claimant in South China Sea dispute. 
Cambodia Naval capacity development and assistance. 
Indonesia 
Arms supplies, increased joint maritime proficiency, technological 
assistance, capacity building in maritime waters, naval training, 
proficiency in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) and other 
non-traditional threats. 
Malaysia Logistical support, capacity development, proficiency in naval training, technological support, South China Sea claimant. 
Myanmar Proficiency in HADR and other non-traditional threats, naval equipment procurement, increased joint maritime proficiency. 
Philippines 
Access to Indian military training, proficiency in HADR and other non-
traditional threats, increased joint maritime proficiency, procurement of 
naval ships, claimant in South China Sea. 
Singapore Desire for advanced naval technological procurement, increased joint maritime proficiency. 
Thailand Increased joint maritime proficiency, security in Malacca Strait, capacity development, proficiency in naval training. 
                                                 
41 Koh Swee Lean Collin, “ASEAN Perspectives on Naval Cooperation with India: Singapore and 
Vietnam” India Review 12, no. 3 (2013): 188, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2013.821326.   
42 Adapted from Ristian Supriyanto, “A Sea of Opportunities: Southeast Asia’s Growing Naval 
Cooperation with India,” in Indian Naval Strategy and Asian Security, ed. Anit Mukherjee and Raja Mohan 
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2015).  
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Country Primary Motivations 
Timor-
Leste Protection of offshore resources, desire to build naval force. 
Vietnam 
Arms supplies, increased joint maritime proficiency, technological 
assistance, capacity building in maritime waters, naval training, South 
China Sea claimant. 
 
Several scholars indicate that because Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia are 
heavily dependent on Russian hardware and arms, their navies seek out naval expertise, 
arms sales, and capability development from India due to India’s historical relationship 
with Russia.43 Other countries in the region seeking out India for capacity development are 
primarily motivated by their desire to build up their naval forces with high-tech capable 
ships. For instance, the Philippines opted to purchase two Indian-built frigates due to its 
multi-mission capabilities.44 
Besides equipment capacity development, most Southeast Asian countries seek 
operational capacity development from India by way of naval exercises. In a 2015 RAND 
Corporation study, an Indian strategist concluded, “Every single Southeast Asian country 
wants to conduct exercises with us, everyone wants to engage with India.”45 
Some scholars assert that claimants in the South China Sea have sought increased 
cooperation with India due to India’s non-alignment policy. South China Sea claimants 
find it beneficial to lean on India because of India’s lack of territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea and their naval outreach to western Southeast Asia.46 Due to India’s sensitivity 
                                                 
43 Jonah Blank et al., Look East, Cross Black Waters: India’s Interest in Southeast Asia (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 128.   
44 “The Reasons Why Philippines Decided to Buy the ‘Karmota Class’ Frigate of India,” Manila 
Livewire, September 1, 2016, https://www.manilalivewire.com/2016/04/the-reasons-why-philippines-
decided-to-buy-the-karmota-class-frigate-of-india/.  
45 Blank et al., Look East, Cross Black Waters, 60.  
46 Acharya, East of India, South of China, 173.  
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to Vietnam’s relationship with China, India’s support to Vietnam for a diplomatic 
resolution of the South China Sea dispute has played a vital role in fortifying mutual trust 
between the two countries.47 
Table 2 supports scholarly assertions that the individual countries in Southeast Asia 
are overall motivated by their desire to develop their naval capacity and increase their naval 
proficiency, and India’s naval superiority and capabilities have thus attracted maritime 
cooperation from these countries. Additionally, claimants in the South China Sea may look 
to India as a maritime security provider because of India’s benign policies. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The literature review reveals the primary reasons that are compelling India and 
Southeast Asia to deepen relations with each other. Also, the literature review establishes 
driving imperatives of Southeast Asian countries for increased cooperation with India and 
reviews ASEAN’s perspective of India’s increased maritime presence in the region. These 
hypotheses drawn from the literature review help to assess the validity of the drivers and 
motivations for increased cooperation between Southeast Asia and India.  
The data presented in Chapters II and III show that hypothesis one and two had 
some validity. Economics does play a role in increased maritime cooperation but is not a 
primary factor driving increased cooperation. Data also found that many countries do seek 
capability development as proposed by hypothesis two. However, Chapters II and III 
refuted hypothesis three. A thorough look at the patterns of India’s naval exercises found 
that India is not directly balancing against China, nor are the countries of Southeast Asia. 
• Hypothesis One: Maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asian 
countries has grown because naval cooperation is conducive for India’s 
desire to protect and enhance its economic linkages. 
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• Hypothesis Two: Maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asian 
countries has increased because individual countries of Southeast Asia 
desire naval capability development from India. 
• Hypothesis Three: Maritime cooperation between India and Southeast 
Asian countries has increased due to their mutual interest in balancing 
against China. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In “A Sea of Opportunities,” Ristian Supriyanto argues that distinctions between 
naval cooperation of individual maritime countries in Southeast Asia and India can be 
divided into three categories: probing, developmental, and advanced.48 Table 3 shows the 
depth and scope of naval cooperation of these three categories in detail. Table 4 shows the 
application of Table 3 regarding bilateral naval cooperation between Southeast Asian 
countries and India. This thesis builds on the foundation provided by Ristian Supriyanto 
by using Table 3 as a guideline for distinctions and incorporating any updates in Table 4 
to show changes in the maritime cooperation over the last several years.  
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Table 3. Three Categories of Naval Cooperation in Southeast Asia49 
Depth/Scope Naval Dialogues & Information Sharing 




& Arms Transfer 
Probing 
Very limited, usually 










Regular and formal as 
per bilateral 
MoU/defense agreement 
(e.g., bilateral joint 
defense committee) 
Mostly functional and 




concrete action is yet 
to be taken 
Advanced 
Regular and formal as 
per bilateral 
MoU/defense agreement 
(e.g., bilateral joint 
defense committee) 









                                                 
49 Adapted from Supriyanto, “A Sea of Opportunities.”  
15 




















Brunei No Yes Yes No Probing 
Cambodia Yes (2007) Yes No No Probing 
Indonesia Yes (2001)  Yes Yes No Developmental 
Malaysia Yes (1993) Yes Yes No Developmental 
Myanmar No Yes Yes Yes Probing 
Philippines Yes (2006) Yes No No Probing 
Singapore Yes (2003) Yes Yes Yes Advanced 
Thailand Yes (2012) Yes Yes No Developmental 
Timor-
Leste No No Yes No Probing 
Vietnam Yes (2007) Yes Yes No Developmental 
 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. This first chapter has described the 
conceptual framework used throughout the thesis, the initial hypotheses, and the 
explanations. Chapter II examines the background and importance of ASEAN-India 
diplomatic security groupings, such as the ARF, as they relate to maritime cooperation. 
Chapter II also examines the multilateral naval cooperation between ASEAN and India. 
Chapter III examines the bilateral naval cooperation from 2013 to 2018 between India and 
each Southeast Asian state, as listed in Table 4. Chapter IV concludes with a summary of 
the research findings, potential areas of further study, and concluding remarks.  
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II. INCREASED ASEAN-INDIA MARITIME COOPERATION, 
1990–2018 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the evolution of maritime security cooperation between 
ASEAN and India from 1990 to 2018. Prior to the 1990s, India and ASEAN’s relationship 
was relatively distant and lacked cooperation due to their divergent trajectories. India was 
“preoccupied with its domestic problems and the conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir, 
while ASEAN remained concerned with the threat of communist insurgency and potential 
Vietnamese and Chinese expansionism” during the Cold War.51 Also, India’s support of 
Vietnam’s invasion into Cambodia was antonymous with ASEAN’s efforts to condemn 
Vietnam’s actions. India showed little interest in engaging ASEAN, and this contributed 
to ASEAN forming a distinct regional institutional identity that did not include India. 
Economic problems in the early 1990s and the fall of the Soviet Union prompted India to 
initiate re-engagement with countries in Southeast Asia.  
This chapter is divided into three periods to allow the identification of patterns of 
increased maritime security cooperation following India’s re-engagement with countries in 
Southeast Asia. Section B discusses the decade from 1990 to 2000, which saw the launch 
of India’s and ASEAN’s security partnership. Section C discusses the years from 2001 to 
2009, which shows an intensification in India’s and ASEAN’s security partnership 
following the emergence of shared interests in combatting transnational terrorism. Finally, 
Section D discusses the period from 2010 to 2018 to demonstrate how increasing shared 
interests in maritime security initiatives contributed to increased maritime cooperation. 
B. 1990–2000: BEYOND THE “LOOK EAST POLICY” 
A key turning point in India’s and ASEAN’s relationship was India’s period of 
economic reform in the early 1990s, when it reached out to Southeast Asia. Amitav 
Acharya explained,  
                                                 
51 Amitav Acharya, Sino-Indian Encounters in Southeast Asia (Oxford University Press, 2017), 49.  
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A major shift occurred when Indian prime minister Narasimha Rao outlined 
a vision of an Indian “Look East” policy whose main thrust was “to draw, 
as much as possible, investment and cooperation from the Asia-Pacific 
countries, in consonance with our common concept and solidarity and my 
faith in our common destiny.52  
This was following the administration’s overall shift in opening up India to pro-free market 
structural adjustments. The Look East policy was more focused on economic growth than 
security concerns as India reached out for new markets and resources. Beginning with this 
policy in 1991, Figure 1 provides a timeline of India’s increasing interaction with various 
organizations that are mentioned throughout the remainder of this chapter. 
                                                 
52 Acharya, Sino-Indian Encounters, 51.  
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Overall, security cooperation between India and ASEAN remained minimal in the 
early 1990s. In 1993, India desired to join the ARF as it presented India with an opening 
to reassess its Look East policy to include more than just an economic focus. However, 
India’s initial application to join the ARF as a founding member was rejected because many 
ASEAN member states had concerns with potential spillover from the dispute between 
India and Pakistan.53 Furthermore, ASEAN member states were concerned about India’s 
naval operations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India’s and ASEAN’s security 
partnership in the first half of the 1990s was nonexistent because ASEAN remained wary 
of involving India. 
To assuage ASEAN member states’ concern about India’s military endeavors, the 
Indian navy began conducting confidence-building measures in the form of small bilateral 
exercises with Singapore and Indonesia.54 To provide transparency, India held the first 
MILAN multilateral exercise, which was merely a gathering of naval officers in the 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands in 1995.55 Finally, in response, Singapore led a significant 
diplomatic effort to secure India’s entry into the ARF in 1996. Singapore advocated for 
India’s inclusion by arguing that India represented a counterbalance to other political 
heavyweights in the region—namely, the United States and China.56  
The Asian financial crisis of 1997, along with India’s nuclear tests in the late 1990s, 
hindered further engagement for several years.57 However, India kept pressing for 
increased cooperation. India held MILAN again in 1999 and, in 2000, India hosted a 
seminar on antipiracy. It has since hosted several events, intersessional workshops, and 
                                                 
53 David Brewster, India as an Asia Pacific Power (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012), 107.  
54 Brewster, India as an Asia Pacific Power, 105.  
55 G. V. C. Naidu, “India’s Strategic and Defense Interaction with Southeast Asia,” in India and 
Southeast Asia: Strategic Convergence in the Twenty-first Century, ed. T. Nirmala Devi and Adluri 
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56 Brewster, India as an Asia Pacific Power, 107.  
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meetings focused on counterterrorism, maritime security, and United Nations’ 
peacekeeping, illustrating its capacity for increased regional collaboration.58  
The inclusion of India into the ARF in 1996 marked the beginning of India and 
ASEAN’s security relationship. In the mid- and late-1990s, the Indian navy began to 
conduct confidence-building exercises with Southeast Asian countries to provide further 
transparency. Overall, however, ASEAN and India’s security cooperation moved at a slow 
pace picking up only after 1995 when it began to develop slowly due to changed global 
climate as well as India’s efforts.   
C. 2001–2009: TERRORISM AND NONTRADITIONAL MARITIME 
THREATS 
From 2001 through 2009, security cooperation was minimal between ASEAN and 
India until the threat of transnational terrorism and nontraditional security threats in the 
early twenty-first century provided a common external threat. Since then, institutional 
security cooperation has steadily grown in the maritime sector. The remainder of this 
section discusses various security issues that have fostered increased cooperation. 
1. Terrorism 
Prior to September 11, 2001, the majority of the interactions between India and 
ASEAN had been economic. High-profile and coordinated attacks in Asia following 
September 11 introduced new security challenges to ASEAN and India and prompted 
increased cooperation. Arabinda Acharya described the violence:  
These include terrorist attacks against the Indian Parliament in December 
2001, the killing of French technicians in May 2002, targeting the American 
Consulate in June 2002, and coordinated attacks against 21 petrol pumps in 
June 2003 in Karachi, Pakistan, suicide attacks in Bali in Indonesia in 
October 2002 and 2005, the bombing of the Marriot Hotel in August 2003 
                                                 
58 “ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 2016, 
https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/ARF_May_2016.pdf.  
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and of the Australian embassy in September 2004 in Jakarta, Indonesia, and 
the explosion in Super Ferry 14 in the Philippines in February 2004.59 
Acharya also noted that during the rise of Islamic terrorism, bilateral alliance systems were 
inadequate to deal with transnational terrorism; thus, a need for multilateral arrangements 
arose and caused India and ASEAN’s partnership to grow. 60 
The first ASEAN-India summit took place in 2002, and the participants specifically 
addressed the necessity to intensify security cooperation in the ARF to combat terrorism 
and other nontraditional threats.61 Later, in 2003, members of the ARF endorsed the ARF 
Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security.62 This 
measure encouraged bilateral and multilateral maritime security cooperation. India would 
go on to agree to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation at the second ASEAN-India Summit 
in Bali, Indonesia in October of 2003. Additionally, the “Joint Declaration on Cooperation 
in Combating International Terrorism was signed, symbolizing concrete initiatives to step 
up cooperation in the fight against terrorism.”63  
2. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
The Asian tsunami in 2004 further placed India in a positive light and alerted 
ASEAN to the need to enhance multilateral disaster relief cooperation. When the tsunami 
hit, “India responded with its largest ever relief operation by sending nearly 20,000 troops, 
40 naval vessels, 35 fixed-wing aircraft, 42 helicopters, and medical teams with relief 
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supplies to Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.”64 India’s response increased the 
standing of its navy throughout Southeast Asia and directly resulted in “an agreement for 
routine refueling and refitting of Indian vessels in six ASEAN nations.”65 Additionally, as 
a result of the tsunami, ASEAN reconvened the ARF intersessional meeting on disaster 
relief in 2004, of which India became an active participant. 66  
3. Antipiracy 
Piracy remains a major concern for the security of India’s shipping through the 
Malacca Strait. For that reason, India increased its engagement in antipiracy regional 
frameworks in Southeast Asia, such as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Created in 2006 to formalize 
antipiracy efforts in Southeast Asia, with India as the 10th ratified member, ReCAAP 
provided an opportunity for seven ASEAN member states and India to interact 
multilaterally.67 India’s notable monetary contribution to ReCAAP has furthered the 
country’s engagement in the region. However, Indonesia and Malaysia found ReCAAP 
controversial due to its claims and profess responsibilities as littoral states to the Straits of 
Malacca.  
In the following years, cooperation on maritime security issues has strengthened. 
The ARF intersessional meeting (ARF ISM) on maritime security was established in 2008 
to promote an annual dialogue. Additionally, the first ARF ISM promoted maritime 
cooperation and capacity building, and its agenda specifically addressed piracy concerns.68 
India’s cooperation with ASEAN in the ARF ISM is still demonstrated today via co-
                                                 
64 Blank et al., Look East, Cross Black Waters, 67.  
65 Blank et al., 67.  
66 Jürgen Haacke, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: From Dialogue to Practical Security Cooperation?” 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22, no. 3 (2009): 429.  
67 The ReCAAP members from ASEAN are Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam.  
68 Sam Bateman, “India and Regional Maritime Security,” in Indian Naval Strategy and Asian 
Security, ed. Anit Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2015).  
24 
chairing seminars and undertaking confidence building measures. For instance, in 2009, 
the Indian Coast Guard organized the ARF Training Program on Maritime Security in 
Chennai.69 
Therefore, it is obvious that transnational terrorism and an increase in 
nontraditional security threats in the maritime sector have fostered increased cooperation 
between ASEAN and India in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Moreover, the 
creation of several regional institutions, meetings, and workshops to combat security 
threats has enabled India to have greater engagement in the region.  
D. 2010–2018: ENHANCED ASEAN-INDIA ENGAGEMENT 
From 2010 to 2018, ASEAN established new security frameworks that provided 
more opportunities for India and ASEAN to cooperate. ADMM+ established in 2010 
provided a new confidence-building platform between ASEAN and its respective dialogue 
partners to enhance defense cooperation and security with the overall goal of stability and 
peace in the region.70 Furthermore, in 2011, the Maritime Security Expert Working Group 
emerged as a subset of ADMM+ to enhance maritime cooperation, identify risks in the 
maritime domain, and encourage wider information sharing.71 It created a forum to bring 
together defense officials and officers of the ASEAN and Indian navies for dialogue and 
has conducted several exercises since its establishment. Between ADMM+ and the ARF, 
the Indian navy began to participate more frequently in naval exercises. 
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1. 2011–2013: Strategic Partnership 
In 2011, India sent Indian Naval Ship (INS) Kesari to participate in the Disaster 
Relief Exercise (DiREx) 2011 in Manado, Indonesia.72 Later, in June 2013, India sent INS 
Gharial to Brunei to participate in the ASEAN Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 
Relief and Military Medicine Exercise.73 As India’s engagement began to grow in 
Southeast Asia, India put forth a blueprint to further enhance its maritime ties in Southeast 
Asia at the 2012 ASEAN-India commemorative summit. Members highlighted the need 
for a rules-based maritime security community and extensively discussed freedom of the 
seas and methods to enhance maritime cooperation. At the summit, ASEAN and India 
upgraded their relationship to a “strategic partnership.” As a direct result, Myanmar and 
Vietnam reached out to India for assistance; India then invested money in Myanmar’s 
coastal defense and provided Vietnam with a $100 million line of credit.74  
2. 2014–2017: Act East Policy 
At the 2014 ASEAN-India summit, India upgraded its Look East policy to the Act 
East policy (AEP). The policy continues to lack a vision statement, but the AEP has been 
an important instrument for India to further enhance engagement with countries in 
Southeast Asia. Amitendu Palit analyzed the strategic depth of the policy, explaining,  
In addition to deeper economic engagement, India would be playing a 
greater geostrategic role by being proactive in areas where its role had 
previously been limited. These include not only humanitarian assistance and 
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disaster relief, but might also extend to maritime security initiatives, 
including joint naval exercises.75  
Palit was correct, and India has been more proactive, especially via maritime cooperation. 
Chapter III further discusses India’s proactive stance in its bilateral partnerships. 
India has since labeled most of its engagement following the AEP’s announcement 
as actions carried out in pursuit of the AEP. Additionally, most of that engagement has 
been through its navy, although there are other areas of cooperation. For instance, India co-
chaired the Expert Working Group on Humanitarian Mine Action with Vietnam from 2014 
to 2017.76  
In May 2015, India sent INS Saryu, a patrol vessel, to participate in the 3rd ASEAN 
DIREX in Penang, Malaysia; the exercise conducted simulated search and rescue 
exercises.77 In the following year, India sent a large amphibious vessel, the INS Airavat, 
capable of transporting 500 troops, 10 tanks, and 11 combat trucks, to participate in the 
ADMM+ Exercise on Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism in Brunei.78 Then in 2017, 
India sent INS Satpura and INS Kadmatt to Pattaya, Thailand to represent India in 
ASEAN’s International Fleet Review, which commemorated the 50th anniversary of 
ASEAN.79 As part of this ASEAN anniversary and ASEAN-India’s 25th anniversary of 
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dialogue relations, the Indian navy deployed four naval vessels to make several port visits 
to ASEAN member states.80 
3. 2018: Enhanced Maritime Initiatives 
To mark the 25th anniversary of their relations, in 2018, ASEAN India relations  
the two jointly adopted the “Delhi Declaration of the ASEAN-India Commemorative 
Summit” that charted the future of the two entities’ relations.81 Moreover, ASEAN and 
India agreed to enhance their maritime cooperation through existing frameworks as well as 
to coordinate efforts to uphold maritime law and further collaborate on various maritime 
issues.82 According to a 2018 press release from the Thai Ministry of Affairs, the “Advisor 
to the Foreign Minister gave a special address on ‘Strengthening India-ASEAN Maritime 
Cooperation,’ highlighting key elements in enhancing ASEAN-India maritime 
cooperation, including historical and civilizational links, maritime infrastructure 
development, the ‘Panca Tara’ Initiative, and maritime safety and security.”83 Since his 
election, Prime Minister Modi has actively advocated for increased maritime cooperation 
with ASEAN, as he did when he visited ASEAN leaders at the ASEAN-India Informal 
Breakfast Summit in Singapore in November 2018.84 
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The Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) 10+1, the East Asia Summit, and the 
Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum have all provided ASEAN member states and India 
with a forum to collaborate on shared maritime concerns. At the 2018 PMC, attendees of 
the ASEAN-India Ministerial Meeting discussed several maritime initiatives, including 
India’s Indo-Pacific concept and enhanced maritime cooperation regarding maritime 
connectivity and the blue economy.85 Good order at sea, the blue economy, and maritime 
safety and security were all topics at the 3rd East Asia Summit on Maritime Security 
conference in July 2018.86 These forums provide guidance for ways in which India and 
ASEAN may collaborate in the future.  
E. CONCLUSION 
From 1990 to 2000, India and ASEAN’s partnership revolved around economics. 
While their security partnership began in 1996 with India’s inclusion in the ARF, little 
security cooperation occurred between them from 1990 to 2000. From 2001 to 2009, the 
increase in transnational terrorism and other nontraditional threats in the maritime sector 
fostered greater cooperation. From 2010 to 2018, both the ARF and the ADMM expanded 
their agenda and activities significantly, therefore increasing the amount of activities in 
which India could participate.87 Additionally, with the implementation of the AEP, India 
set out to take a more active role in affairs in Southeast Asia. Over the last three decades, 
cooperation between ASEAN and India has grown from economic initiatives alone to 
shared interests in combatting maritime security threats, enhancing maritime cooperation, 
and maintaining good order at sea.  
Analysis of the first hypothesis from Chapter I demonstrates that economics does 
play a role in increased maritime cooperation. That is, efforts to curb piracy and terrorism 
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and sea protect shipping. However, it is not clear from the data discussed in this chapter 
that economics was a driving factor for increased maritime cooperation between ASEAN 
and India.  
The second hypothesis is partially supported in this chapter. ASEAN-India 
meetings have resulted partially due to outreach from certain countries seeking Indian 
investment, which India has provided. Many ASEAN countries utilize ADMM+ meetings 
as a multilateral platform for engaging the Indian defense establishment. However, without 
taking a closer look at bilateral relations, Chapter II cannot provide enough evidence for 
hypothesis two. However, Chapter III further substantiates hypothesis two. 
This chapter does not support hypothesis three. While an increase in rhetoric for 
good order at sea is aimed at containing Chinese territorial claims, very little rhetoric is 
found within ASEAN-India’s dialogue to support the premise that the two entities form a 
balancing weight against China. Some analysts believe that the AEP is a policy instrument 
to shore up against China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative. For instance, Palit declares, 
“There is little doubt over engagement with China being an integral part of the Act East 
policy.”88 In that regard, India may see itself as a counterweight against China. However, 
data in this chapter does not support the understanding that ASEAN shares that same view 
of its own role in relation to China, as hypothesis three proposes. Chapter III, on bilateral 
naval cooperation between India and the individual countries of Southeast Asia, aids a 
further understanding of hypotheses one, two, and three.  
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III. INDIA’S BILATERAL MARITIME COOPERATION WITH 
COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Indian navy’s method of taking on a greater strategic role in Southeast Asia is 
primarily through expanding naval cooperation by increasing the number of ship visits and 
regular naval exercises and patrols.89 This chapter presents data from 2013 to 2018 on 
Indian naval cooperation with individual Southeast Asian countries and focuses on 
identifying and explaining some patterns in that cooperation. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides a snapshot of 
Indian naval port visits and exercises utilizing data from the Appendix. The second section 
examines bilateral naval cooperation between India and the individual countries of 
Southeast Asia utilizing data from the Appendix and other sources. The third section uses 
Supriyanto’s framework to assess changes in the scope and depth of naval cooperation 
between India and Southeast Asian countries since 2015, which was the last year for which 
Supriyanto presents data.90 The third section also highlights emerging patterns observed 
through the data throughout this chapter. 
B. INDIA’S INCREASED NAVAL COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The most concrete way to show the increased bilateral naval cooperation between 
India and Southeast Asian countries is by examining the quantity of port visits and naval 
exercises undertaken. The Appendix compiles data to appropriately examine the quantity 
of port visits and naval exercises and supplements this chapter. The Appendix extended 
Ajaya Das’s timeline of India’s naval exercises with ASEAN states from 1991–2013 to the 
end of 2018 and includes port visits for greater context. The Appendix utilizes data from 
various news sources, India’s annual defense reports, and numerous press releases from 
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2013 to 2018. It is important to note that the data found in the Appendix is thorough but 
may not be complete. Even so, the data is sufficient to analyze certain trends.  
One trend that the Appendix reveals is the rising number of port visits of the Indian 
navy to Southeast Asian countries since 2015; this is presented in Table 5. In contrast to 
Das’s timeline, the Appendix includes port visits that provides supporting evidence to data 
gathered on naval exercises. For instance, the Indian navy visited Indonesia, Thailand, 
Myanmar, and Singapore more than the other countries in Southeast Asia, which supports 
assertions on India’s relations with those countries made in Section C. 
The Appendix also lists a remarkable increase in the number of naval exercises in 
a shorter time frame. His timeline from 1991 to the early part of 2013 lists 74 naval 
exercises over nearly 23 years.91 Table 6 concludes with a total of 48 exercises in just six 
years. One point to mention is that Das’s timeline only lists one naval exercise with 
Myanmar. The Appendix shows an increase in naval exercises with Myanmar to include 
regular coordinated patrols.  
The researcher used data from Appendix to create Tables 5 and 6, which provide 
snapshots of the Indian navy’s port visits from 2013 to 2018 and naval exercises by country. 
The two tables show that since the implementation of Prime Minister Modi’s AEP in the 
second half of 2014, the number of India’s naval activities in Southeast Asia has grown 
each year. Furthermore, the two tables comparatively show the prevalence of the Indian 
navy’s presence in a country-by-country categorization.  
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Table 5. The Indian Navy’s Southeast Asian Port Visits by 
Country92 
Port Visits 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
Brunei 1 1 0 1 1 0 4 
Cambodia 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Indonesia 0 3 3 5 7 6 22 
Malaysia 1 0 2 1 4 2 9 
Myanmar 0 1 2 2 3 4 12 
Philippines 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Singapore 1 0 2 2 2 3 10 
Thailand 1 2 2 2 3 2 12 
Timor-Leste 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vietnam 1 1 1 1 1 2 7 
Annual 
Totals 6 9 14 15 23 19 86 
Some port visits associated with coordinated patrols could not be identified; actual 
numbers may be higher. 
Table 6. The Indian Navy’s Participation in Bilateral Naval 
Exercises in Southeast Asia by Year and Country93 
Naval Exercises  2013  2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total  
Brunei 0 0 0 0 0b 0 0 
Cambodia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indonesia 2 2 2 2 2 3 13 
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Myanmar 1 1 1 1 1 3 8 
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Singapore 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Thailand 2 2 2 2 1 2 11 
Timor-Leste 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 1d 1 
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Naval Exercises  2013  2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total  
Multilaterala 1 2 1 2 0 2 8 
Annual Totals 7 8 7 8 6 12 48 
a Multilateral exercises include ARF, ADMM+, KOMODO, and MILAN. 
b PASSEX are not reflected but mentioned in the Appendix. 
c An embedded bilateral exercise in the fall cycle of the India-Indonesia coordinated 
patrol. 
d Vietnam and India’s first bilateral exercise in 2018 is disputed. 
 
However, Tables 5 and 6 both fail to provide the depth and scope of the naval 
exercises held and the reasons why India made port visits to certain countries. For instance, 
India made more port visits in 2017 because that year marked the 25th anniversary of 
Indian-ASEAN dialogue, which the Indian navy commemorated with a special 
deployment. SIMBEX-16 was also conducted between the Indian navy and the Republic 
of Singapore Navy (RSN) with the participation of four vessels, while 16 vessels from the 
two navies participated in SIMBEX-18.94 This is important to note because the increased 
participation of both navies may increase interoperability and further deepen naval 
cooperation. The following section discusses further country-by-country patterns observed 
from the Appendix.  
C. BILATERAL MARITIME COOPERATION 
The central purpose of this section is to provide an update on the status of India’s 
naval cooperative relationships with Southeast Asian countries since Supriyanto’s analysis 
of such relationships in 2015.95 The status of naval cooperation between India and 
individual Southeast Asian countries is provided by comparatively categorizing the scope 
and the depth of the respective maritime cooperation under three distinctive levels: probing, 
developmental, and advanced cooperation, as Table 3 in Chapter I illustrates.96 Table 3’s 
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framework is useful because it provides criteria for assessing the scope and depth of the 
naval cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries. Additionally, the 
framework is helpful because it can be used to monitor the quality of the relationships and 
to depict whether or not progress has occurred. The rest of this section is organized as a 
country-by-country catalogue to provide a deeper understanding of the tables and the data 
provided throughout this thesis. 
1. Brunei 
Little evidence since 2015 supports further development past the probing stage, 
although India’s naval interaction with Brunei has increased. At the time of Supriyanto’s 
review of the relations between India and Brunei in 2015, a defense memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) between the two countries had yet to be signed.97 However, in 
February 2016, India and Brunei solidified the basis of their cooperation by signing a 
defense MOU with a framework for the exchange of visits, experiences, information, and 
training and for conducting joint military exercises, discussions, and seminars.98 Two 
measurable activities have occurred between the two navies since the MOU. First, the 2016 
ADMM+ Exercise on Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism was held in Brunei, where 
INS Airavat, a large amphibious ship, participated alongside ships from 14 other 
countries.99 Second, INS Satpura, a frigate, visited Muara, Brunei, where the two navies 
conducted a PASSEX in 2017.100 At the 2018 ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit, 
India’s Prime Minister Modi and Brunei’s Sultan Bolkiah held a bilateral meeting to 
discuss bolstering their defense, security, and energy cooperation. However, no concrete 
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maritime-related collaboration occurred in 2018 aside from informal talks.101 Most 
activities between India and Brunei remained irregular and incidental although the defense 
MOU called for regularizing cooperation. One reason that activities with Brunei may not 
expand beyond port visits and ASEAN-led exercises is India’s apparent aversion to 
bilateral exercises with claimant states of the South China Sea as Table 6 reflects. 
2. Cambodia 
Cambodia’s maritime cooperation with India remains at the probing stage due to 
its navy’s lack of capacity to participate in naval exercises and Cambodia’s ties with China. 
Supriyanto argues that despite the 2007 defense agreement between Cambodia and India, 
Cambodia lacked the requisite equipment and funding to further deepen its level of 
cooperation.102 Overall, the capacity of the Royal Cambodian Navy limits further 
cooperation between the two navies and is why that bilateral interaction between Cambodia 
and India mainly takes place in the form of dialogues. Additionally, Cambodia’s 
partnership with China supersedes all other partnerships because most of Cambodia’s naval 
vessels. However, Cambodia’s participation in MILAN, hosted by the Indian navy, in 2014 
and in 2018 demonstrates that the country has at least some willingness to cooperate with 
countries other than China.103 Another way that increased cooperation occurred was when 
Indian naval ships docked in Cambodia and conducted a PASSEX in 2015 and docked 
again in 2017;104 both were goodwill visits. Their maritime partnership in the past couple 
of years is possibly representative of deepening ties; nonetheless, there has been little 
maritime interaction.  
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3. Indonesia 
Several developments over the last three years have transitioned the relationship 
between India and Indonesia to an advanced stage. Supriyanto placed the India-Indonesia 
naval relationship at the developmental stage because their coordinated patrols began to 
lose steam in 2015.105 However, three main developments over the last several years of 
naval cooperation between these two countries suggest the opposite. First, the total of 22 
port visits by the Indian navy to Indonesia during the period from 2013 to 2018 is markedly 
higher than that of any other country visited by the Indian navy. The reasons for the visits 
include port calls as part of Indian deployments, coordinated patrols, port calls for India’s 
training fleet, and participation in Indonesia’s KOMODO multilateral exercises. One port 
visit was for an operational turnaround during which India began to coordinate a plan to 
develop Sabang, a western port in Indonesia.106  
Second, coordinated patrols between India and Indonesia have grown in complexity 
to include a bilateral exercise (later developed into a separate bilateral exercise). 
Additionally, India and Indonesia held their inaugural bilateral exercise in conjunction with 
the 26th Indian-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol (IND-INDO CORPAT), held in the fall of 
2015.107 After holding the embedded exercise again, along with the 27th and the 28th IND-
INDO CORPAT in 2016 and 2017, respectively, the two countries opted to conduct a 
separate inaugural bilateral exercise, Samudra Shakti, in 2018.108 Samudra Shakti 
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consisted of a harbor phase and a sea phase consisting of antisubmarine warfare, surface 
warfare, and antipiracy exercises.109 
Third, India and Indonesia have increased their partnership from a strategic to a 
comprehensive strategic partnership when Prime Minister Modi and President Widodo met 
in 2018. During the meeting, President Widodo said, “In defence, both leaders reached 
agreement to advance maritime cooperation, particularly in the context of the Indo-Pacific 
strategy.”110 Additionally, Prime Minister Modi remarked, “India’s vision on security and 
welfare in the region and its Act East Policy were similar to Mr. Joko’s maritime fulcrum 
policy.”111 The leaders agreed to develop infrastructure to support their maritime 
connectivity, joint manufacturing of water cannons, future cooperation in military training, 
and enhancement of other areas of cooperation.112 
In accordance with Supriyanto’s framework and the above-listed developments, 
India and Indonesia’s maritime partnership is categorized at the advanced level. 
Additionally, as data in Tables 5 and 6 show, it is evident that Indonesia is the main focus 
of India’s strategic objectives in Southeast Asia, and in response, Indonesia has 
reciprocated interest. For example, India has one oil bloc in Indonesia and provides 
hydrographic assistance and expertise to Indonesia, which may be a potential explanation 
for increased cooperation. 
4. Malaysia 
India and Malaysia’s naval cooperation remains at the developmental stage despite 
India’s frequent port visits to Malaysia. Supriyanto attributes this limitation of their 
partnership to Malaysia, stating, “Malaysia does not intend to make participation regular 
nor is it willing to conduct ‘coordinated patrols’ with the Indian Navy in the Andaman 
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Sea.”113 Supriyanto’s statement is corroborated with data from Table 6. Although the 
Indian navy traveled to Malaysia to participate in a HADR exercise in 2017, the prior years’ 
bilateral activity is almost nonexistent.114 The Indian navy and the Royal Malaysian 
Navy’s exercises typically only occur at the multilateral level as seen by Malaysia’s 
participation in MILAN-14 and MILAN-18.115  
There are several reasons (unrelated to maritime security) why further maritime 
cooperation is unlikely between Malaysia and India, one of which is Malaysia’s 
relationship with China. In 2017, Rajiv Bhatia said, 
Mutual negative perceptions, which existed in the past, have diminished, 
but they have not disappeared altogether. The Indian side tends to view 
Malaysia as being too close to China, deeply sympathetic towards Pakistan, 
and always anxious to assert its Islamic identity under the influence of the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The Malaysian side seems to 
dwell on the disconnect between India’s commitments and delivery, the 
huge asymmetry of power between China and India, and the impressive 
success of Malaysia’s development model as compared to India’s. 
Nevertheless, politico-economic convergences and bonds of history, culture 
and the diaspora have ensured that the two nations essentially relate to each 
other as good partners and friends today.116 
However, in a progressive step, Malaysia and India held a high-level delegation 
meeting to discuss deepening their maritime cooperation to include advanced maritime 
security initiatives in July 2018. Both countries agreed to upgrade their maritime 
cooperation to include bilateral naval exercises, which is a step toward advanced 
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cooperation.117 While some progress has occurred, Indian and Malaysian maritime 
cooperation still falls under the developmental stage per Supriyanto’s framework because 
of Malaysia’s tightknit relationship with China and India’s aversion for bilateral exercises 
with South China Sea claimant states. 
5. Myanmar 
Key events over the last three years have transitioned the relationship between India 
and Myanmar to a developmental stage. The infancy of their newly increased relationship 
puts their cooperation at a developmental stage, despite meeting all criteria (as shown in 
Table 3) regarding the depth of an advanced stage. In other words, regularity in complex 
exercises has yet to be observed. The data in the Appendix illustrates the rise in maritime 
cooperation between India and Myanmar. The Indian and the Myanmar navies conducted 
coordinated patrols annually from 2013 until 2017 and increased these to twice a year in 
2018.118 Additionally, India and Myanmar also kicked off their nine-day maiden naval 
exercise, called the India-Myanmar Naval Exercise 2018 (IMNEX-18).119 Its first phase 
was held at the harbor where both navies conducted cross-deck familiarization training, 
demonstrations, and sporting events. The at-sea phase included antisubmarine exercises, 
live gun firings, and fleet maneuvers.120 
Furthermore, the countries signed a defense MOU in September 2017, which was 
a crucial development that solidified the deepening of the maritime security cooperative 
partnership between India and Myanmar.121 Additionally, the maiden Joint Consultative 
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Commission Meeting between the two countries concluded with India’s pact to assist in 
the modernization of Myanmar’s army and navy, with the aim of taking its “military to 
military cooperation to the next level.”122 While the increase in maritime cooperation 
between Myanmar and India may be attributed to Myanmar’s political reforms during 2011 
through 2015, it is apparent that the interaction between the two countries has expanded 
and is on a trajectory toward deeper cooperation. Another explanation for increased 
maritime cooperation may be that India has eight oil blocs in Myanmar.123 
6. Philippines 
There is very little evidence that maritime cooperation between the Philippines and 
India has proceeded beyond the probing stage. In 2015, Supriyanto predicted a likely 
increase in maritime cooperation between the Philippines and India. However, Tables 5 
and 6 reflect only five port visits and zero bilateral exercise over the past six years. 
Multilaterally, their navies interacted in MILAN-14 and the 2016 ADMM+ exercise in 
Brunei. India desires to remain engaged with the Philippines and continues to conduct 
goodwill port visits, but development has moved at a slow pace. At the January 2018 
ASEAN-India conference, Prime Minister Modi held a bilateral meeting with President 
Duterte, wherein both parties agreed that cooperation between the two countries could gain 
some momentum.124 Prime Minister Modi and President Duterte also agreed that “under 
India’s AEP and the Philippines’ Build, Build, Build Program, there are several areas for 
cooperation between private sectors of the two countries.”125 However, little naval 
cooperation has occurred between the two countries since 2013 or even since the signing 
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of the Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2006. One reason may be that India intentionally 
avoids naval cooperation with countries whose South China Sea claims conflict with 
China’s.  
7. Singapore 
India’s maritime partnership with Singapore is the most advanced among the 
Southeast Asian nations. Beginning in 1993, the navies of Singapore and India have held 
regular exercises, made frequent port visits, and made advancements in the industrial 
defense realm.126 The year 2018 marked the 25th anniversary of the long-standing 
SIMBEX. SIMBEX grows each year in complexity with either additional forces or the 
depth in the exercises. In SIMBEX-18, both navies used submarines for the first time to 
enhance their antisubmarine training.127 Additionally, 2018 was a year full of bilateral 
agreements between the two countries, most of which were renewals or revisions of 
previous agreements. For instance, both India and Singapore signed a revised defence 
cooperation agreement  allowing easier access to each other’s naval ports to further 
strengthen their defense relationship.128  
The India-Singapore cooperation is already advanced and continues to advance 
further because of their shared interests. Of note, the Singapore Armed Forces is the only 
country to hold bilateral agreements with India for every branch of armed forces.129 
Singapore has always been a gateway to ASEAN for India as Singapore continually 
supports and requests increased engagement from India. Overall, India and Singapore’s 
pursuit of regional collaboration in support of the Indo-Pacific region’s security is 
reflective of their efforts to further deepen maritime cooperation.  
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8. Thailand 
Held twice a year since 2006, Indo-Thai coordinated patrols represent India and 
Thailand’s maritime partnership. Because of the regular occurrence of these naval 
exercises, the depth of the relationship between the two countries could pass from the 
developmental to the advanced stage, depending on the results of their increased efforts in 
both technological and industrial sectors. One observation from date in the Appendix is 
that the Indo-Thai coordinated patrols over the last six years have not really increased in 
complexity. Their coordinated patrols have not included additional ships or complex 
scenarios, such as antisubmarine warfare, as India has done with Indonesia and 
Myanmar.130 On the other hand, Tables 5 and 6 reflect high numbers of port visits over 
the last six years. Thailand has also attended every MILAN exercise held by India, which 
is a testament to their long partnership.131  
While their cooperation level remains the same as when Supriyanto analyzed their 
partnership in 2015, in July 2018, Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-Cha visited Prime 
Minister Modi in India to consider enhanced maritime security cooperation between the 
two countries.132 The main issues that the two leaders discussed were ways to increase 
maritime cooperation and ways to meet their shared regional goals and bilateral interests 
in economics and research and development.133 Without advances in the maritime sector 
and added complexities, the framework in Table 3 still places Thailand at the 
developmental level. If Thailand and India deepen the complexities of their coordinated 
patrols and further expand bilateral naval industrial cooperation, then the two countries 
would meet the criteria for an advanced level of cooperation. 
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9. Timor-Leste 
India’s maritime cooperative partnership with Timor-Leste remains at the probing 
stage due to Timor-Leste’s small naval force. The Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan 
(2011–2030) states that by 2030, “The naval component of the F-FDTL [Timor-Leste 
Defence Force] will be well trained with the necessary infrastructure to control and protect 
our territorial waters and participate as a full partner in international naval exercises.”134 
A 2018 article on the India Today website remarks that representatives from Timor-Leste 
have briefed their Indian counterparts on their strong desire for enhanced cooperation in 
increasing their maritime capacity.135 Of note, India lists Timor-Leste as a maritime 
investment due to India’s contracted rights to explore two oil blocs in Timor-Leste’s 
economic exclusion zone.136 India’s interests in the country will likely increase due to 
India’s oil blocs in Timor-Leste and Timor-Leste’s desire to increase its naval capacity. 
10. Vietnam 
India and Vietnam’s naval partnership remains at the developmental stage due to 
the lack of bilateral exercises, despite the increased naval cooperation between the two 
countries. The lack of bilateral exercises may be due to Vietnam’s policy approach to the 
South China Sea dispute, which is a three-pronged strategy: accommodating China’s 
interests, increasing self-defense, and mobilizing international support.137 Vietnam has 
affirmed that it will neither have military alliances nor allow foreign bases and will 
maintain a general policy of independence to cooperate with China’s interests. However, 
India and Vietnam’s maritime cooperation may contradict Vietnam’s policy. 
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In 2016, Vietnamese submariners went to India to learn to operate and maintain 
Vietnam’s procurement of six Kilo-class submarines.138 To convey India’s desire to invest 
in Vietnam, India conducted further training of the Vietnam People’s Navy in 2016 when 
a 49-member team went to the INS Eksila for a lengthy program on the operation and the 
maintenance of M-15 gas turbines.139 In late 2018, India and Vietnam met and agreed to 
step up their defense cooperation to include oil exploration and maritime cooperation. 
Specifically, the meeting reaffirmed their position on unimpeded economic activities and 
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.140 During INS Sahyadri, INS Shakti, and 
INS Kamorta’s visit to Da Nang, Vietnam in 2018, experts believe that the countries 
engaged in an inaugural bilateral exercise; however, neither country has revealed much.141 
According data in Table 6, India and Vietnam have only participated in one bilateral 
exercise. This is important because Vietnam is the only South China Sea claimant state 
with which India has held a bilateral exercise. Perhaps the countries revealed little the 
inaugural bilateral exercise in 2018 because of Vietnam and India’s risk aversion to 
China.142  
Overall, the maritime partnership between Vietnam and India remains at the 
developmental stage, but the scope of their cooperation is increasing. If Vietnam and India 
had developed regular coordinated patrols similar to those between India and Myanmar, 
Thailand, and Indonesia, then its partnership with India would have reached an advanced 
stage of cooperation.  
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D. EMERGING PATTERNS AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This presented research in this chapter has defined and examined the development 
of naval cooperation between India and the individual countries of Southeast Asia using 
data retrieved from various sources. From increased port visits to greater complexity in 
naval exercises, India and Southeast Asian countries been enhancing their maritime 
cooperation. Table 7 shows the changes compared with Table 4 (in Chapter I) and reflects 
India’s greater presence and increasing strategic role in Southeast Asia since 2015. 
Tables 5 and 6 and the individual sections on bilateral cooperation clearly indicate that 
India’s maritime cooperation has grown, especially with Indonesia and Myanmar. Section 
C has shown increased cooperation outside of what Tables 5 and 6 could provide in a 
country-by-country catalog.  
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Table 7. Updated Status of India’s Cooperative Relationships with 
























Brunei Yes (2016) Yes Yes No Probing 
Cambodia Yes (2007) Yes No No Probing 
Indonesia Yes (2001)  Yes Yes Yes Advanced 
Malaysia Yes (1993) Yes Yes No Developmental 
Myanmar Yes (2017) Yes Yes Yes Developmental 
Philippines Yes (2006) Yes No No Probing 
Singapore Yes (2003) Yes Yes Yes Advanced 
Thailand Yes (2012) Yes Yes No Developmental 
Timor- 
Leste No No Yes No Probing 
Vietnam Yes (2007) Yes Yes Yes Developmental 
Note: The bold text denotes a difference since the status indicated in Table 4, Chapter I. 
 
                                                 
143 Adapted from Supriyanto, “A Sea of Opportunities.”  
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India’s outreach, and perhaps prioritization, of certain Southeast Asian countries is 
informative regarding its strategic objective to deepen ties in the region. Collectively, data 
explored in all sections of this thesis reveals emerging patterns. First, the data supports a 
pattern of India’s risk aversion to participating in naval exercises with claimant states in 
the South China Sea. Second, the data supports a pattern in increased cooperation with 
Indonesia and Myanmar, which both share boundaries with India. Third, the data supports 
a pattern of increased cooperation with Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar, all of which 
hold India’s oil bloc investments in their waters. Lastly, the data supports a pattern of 
Southeast Asian countries’ desires for capability development from India.  
When analyzing the first hypothesis from Chapter I, economics does play a role in 
increased maritime cooperation. That is, there is a correlation of increased maritime 
cooperation between the countries where India has current contracts for oil investment. The 
exception is Timor-Leste, due to its limited naval capacity. However, it is not clear that 
economics is a primary factor for increased maritime cooperation between India and the 
individual countries of Southeast Asia.  
The second hypothesis is supported in this chapter. Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, 
and Myanmar have all enhanced their naval capacity development by increasing maritime 
cooperation with India. Vietnam is the most notable case that supports this hypothesis as 
India has provided training and has given lines of credit to Vietnam’s military.  
This chapter does not support hypothesis three. First, no Southeast Asia country is 
forming an anti-China alliance with India. Also, trends in the Appendix’s data revealed 
that Cambodia, Malaysia, and those that have maritime disputes with China hardly 
participated in naval exercises with India from 2013 to 2018. Both patterns suggest that 




This thesis has shown that maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asia 
has grown over the last several years and has sought to understand why. Collectively, 
Chapters I, II, and III answer the research question of why Indian security cooperation with 
certain Southeast Asian countries has grown so much during the last several years. To begin 
this exploration, Chapter I proposed three hypotheses: first that India and Southeast Asia 
maritime cooperation has grown because it protects India’s economic interests in the 
region; second that maritime cooperation has grown because individual countries in 
Southeast Asia desired naval development through partnership with India; and third that 
maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asian nations has increased due to a 
shared interest in balancing against China. 
Chapter I presented evidence of the increased maritime cooperation between India 
and countries of Southeast Asia and examined the driving factors for this growth for India, 
the individual countries of Southeast Asia, and ASEAN. Chapter II then established a 
timeline to demonstrate patterns of increased maritime cooperation between India and 
ASEAN since the beginning of the twenty-first century, and that the data revealed that the 
rise in cooperation was due to India and Southeast Asia’s efforts to enhance maritime 
security. Subsequently, Chapter III utilized the research design framework presented in 
Chapter I to further demonstrate the increase in maritime security cooperation from 2013 
to 2018 and explain emerging patterns.  
Throughout this examination, weak evidence supports the first hypothesis. Chapter 
III found that maritime cooperation increased with countries where Indian companies have 
oil exploration contracts. However, there is little evidence that India’s naval cooperation 
increased with those countries to defend their economic interests. Further research is 
needed to support the assertion that maritime cooperation has increased due to India’s 
desire to protect its economic linkages.  
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The second hypothesis is supported by evidence from Chapter III. Chapter III’s 
evidence revealed that maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries 
has increased because individual countries in Southeast Asia desire naval capability 
development from India, and the chapter demonstrates how certain countries have received 
such developments specifically from partnerships with India. For instance, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, and Myanmar have all bolstered their antisubmarine warfare capabilities by 
participating in complex exercises with India. The development of Sabang port in 
Indonesia as well as India’s training of Vietnamese sailors are additional examples of the 
country’s naval contributions to maritime cooperation with Southeast Asian nations. In 
general, Southeast Asian countries welcome the opportunity to increase their naval 
capabilities by enhancing their joint maritime expertise. Most of this capability 
development is motivated by a desire to counter nontraditional security threats, such as 
HADR, terrorism, and piracy. The research found little evidence to support countries’ 
needs for enhanced capability motivated by a desire to counter China. 
Specific evidence in Chapter III refutes the third hypothesis and implies that India 
is trying to avoid directly balancing against China. Chapter III found that India has only 
held one bilateral exercise with a claimant state of the South China Sea (Vietnam). The 
bilateral exercise held with Vietnam in 2018 yielded few public details, and neither side 
released a public statement. Aside from Vietnam, India’s maritime cooperation with 
Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines has only marginally approved since 2015. Overall, 
there is not strong balancing behavior to support hypothesis three. 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis reveals that since the implementation of AEP in 2014, India’s maritime 
relationships with countries in Southeast Asia has primarily increased with nonclaimant 
states of the South China Sea. An examination of port visits and naval exercises shows that 
India rarely held naval exercises with claimant states (only Vietnam), further indicating 
India’s risk aversion toward China. Additionally, exploration of the depth of India’s 
security relationships with ASEAN and with individual countries of Southeast Asia 
demonstrates that India has formed tighter partnerships with Myanmar, with which India 
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shares a land border, and Indonesia, with which it shares a maritime border. This implies 
India’s relative comfort in expanding cooperation with its neighbors and substantiates the 
assertion that India’s interests lie in securing its own borders. Another implication derived 
from this thesis is that India can be expected to further deepen maritime cooperation with 
the individual countries of Southeast Asia due to the developmental factor driving it; the 
desire of Southeast Asian countries for enhanced maritime security and naval capabilities 
places India in a position to take on a greater role in the region and permits India to take 
advantage of that role. Lastly, the results of this research imply that India’s enhanced role 
and ambitions in Southeast Asia may not necessarily be a fulcrum to assist the United States 
in an immediate counterbalancing role against China. Data throughout this thesis suggests 
that India’s maritime interests are mainly in securing India’s own borders and not balancing 
against China. The United States’ vision for India to assist in counterbalancing does not 
seem to be reciprocated by India. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
One area for further research that would expand understanding of India’s maritime 
relations in Southeast Asia would be to look at India’s maritime partnerships with countries 
that hold congruent interests in the region. For example, examination of the India-U.S. or 
India-Japan naval relationships and actions in Southeast Asia may provide greater context. 
Additionally, given that maritime partnership is within the broader domain of security 
cooperation, further examination of all aspects of security cooperation may provide a more 
holistic perspective for increased reciprocity in this regard. One way to research security 
cooperation as a whole would be to undertake research using case studies of claimant and 
nonclaimant states in the South China Sea disputes. Finally, another interesting area of 
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APPENDIX.  INDIA’S NAVAL EXERCISES AND PORT VISITS 
WITH AND TO ASEAN STATES FROM 2013–2018 
2013  
March 17–21 Maiden coordinated patrol (CORPAT) with the Myanmar navy 
(MN) was conducted near the Great Coco Islands, Myanmar, with 
INS Baratang and Battimalv and MN ships Aungzeya and 
Bayintnaung.144 
April 18–26 The 16th cycle of INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted with INS 
Bitra and His Thai Majesty’s Ship (HTMS) Phuket.145 
May 6–26 21st IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted along their international 
maritime boundary line (IMBL) with INS Mahish, INS Bangaram, 
and one Dornier. Indonesia participating units were Kapal perang 
Republik Indonesia (KRI) Pattinunas and one CASA-50 aircraft.146 
May 15 Port visit: INS Satpura and INS Kirch visited Singapore for 
International Maritime Conference and Exhibition (IMDEX) 
2013.147 
May 16–23 The Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX-13) was 
conducted in the South China Sea with INS Satpura and Kirch, 
Royal Singapore Ship (RSS) Steadfast and Valiant (including 
integral helicopters), RSS Conqueror (submarine), and an aircraft 
Fokker 50.148 
May 26–31 Port visit: Frigate INS Satpura, Rajput class destroyer INS Ranvijay, 
corvette INS Kirch, and replenishment vessel INS Shakti led by Rear 
Admiral Ajit Kumar visited Port Klang, Malaysia, as part of a 
Western Pacific deployment.149 
                                                 
144 Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2013–14.  
145 Das, “India’s Naval Exercises with ASEAN.”  
146 Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2013–14.  
147 “IMDEX 2013: World Navies Gather in Singapore,” Defense Update, May 15, 2013, 
https://defense-update.com/20130515_imdex2013_day.html.  
148 Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2013–14.   




June 5–8 Port visit: INS Satpura, INS Ranvijay, INS Kirch, and INS Shakti 
led by Rear Admiral Ajit Kumar visited Danang, Vietnam, as part of 
a Western Pacific deployment.150 
June 10–22 Port visit and exercise: INS Gharial visited Brunei and participated 
in the ASEAN Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief and 
Medical Medicine Exercise.151 
June 12–15 Port visit: INS Satpura, INS Ranvijay, INS Kirch, and INS Shakti 
led by Rear Admiral Ajit Kumar visited Manila, Philippines, as part 
of a Western Pacific deployment.152 
September 6–
27 
22nd IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted along their IMBL with 
INS Kumbhir, one Indian Dornier, KRI Teiku Umar, and one 
Indonesian CASA-50 aircraft.153 
November 13–
18 
The 17th cycle of INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted in the 
Andaman Sea and exercised counterpiracy, poaching, and arms 
smuggling. The participating ships were INS Bitra, one Indian 
Dornier, HTMS Phuket, and HTMS Sriracha.154 
November 19–
20 
Port visit: The 17th INDO-THAI CORPAT closing ceremony was 
held in Phuket.155 
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153 Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2013–14.   
154 Ministry of Defence, Government of India.  
155 “Indo-Thai Coordinated Patrol in the Andaman Sea,” Bank of India, Bangkok, press release, 
November 21, 2013, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/CountryNews/1673_Press_Release_-_CORPAT.pdf.   
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2014  
February 2–10 MILAN-2014 was conducted at Port Blair with 14 participating 
countries: Australia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, Cambodia, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, New Zealand, 




The 2nd cycle of the IN-MN CORPAT (IMCOR) was conducted in 
conjunction with MILAN-14.157 
February 20 Port visit: The 2nd Indian-Myanmar CORPAT closing ceremony 
was held in Yangon, Myanmar.158 
March 28–
April 3 
Port visit and exercise: INS Sukanya with integral Chetak 
participated in the six-day exercise, KOMODO-14, at Batam Bay, 
Natuna Islands, and Anambas Islands. KOMODO-14 consisted of a 
harbor phase, a sea phase, and a civic mission phase.159 
April 16–May 
3 
23rd IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted along their IMBL with 
KRI Imam Bonjol, an Indonesian maritime patrol aircraft CN 235, 
INS Kumbhir, and one Indian Dornier.160 
April 30–May 
2 
Port visit: 23rd IND-INDO closing ceremony was held at Belawan, 
Indonesia.161 
April 1–8 18th INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted with participating INS 
Bangaram, one Indian Dornier, HTMS Sriracha, and one RTN 
Dornier.162 
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May 22–28 SIMBEX–14 was conducted in the Andaman Sea in May 2014 with 
INS Kuthar, INS Karmuk, an Indian maritime patrol aircraft, and 
Singapore ships Valour and Independence.163 
August Port visit: INS Shivalik, INS Ranvijay, and INS Shakti made a three-
day goodwill port visit to Hai Phong, Vietnam, after participating in 
various exercises including MALABAR-14 in the South China 
Sea.164 
August 8–11 Port visit: INS Shakti visited Brunei as a goodwill port call.165 
August 20–24 Port visit: INS Sahyadri made a port call in Manila, Philippines, on its 
way back from participating in RIMPAC 14.166 
September 9–
11 




24th IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with KRI 
Pattimura, Indonesian maritime patrol aircraft CN 235, INS Kesari, 
and one Indian Dornier.168 
November 18–
26 
The 19th cycle of INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted in the 
Andaman Sea and exercised counter piracy, poaching, and arms 




Port visit: The 19th INDO-THAI CORPAT closing ceremony was 
held in Phuket.170 
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2015  
March 16 Port visit: The 3rd IMCOR opening ceremony was held at Yangon, 
Myanmar.171 
March 16–22 The 3rd IMCOR was conducted in the Andaman Sea.172 
March 22 Port visit: The 3rd IMCOR closing ceremony was held at Great Coco 
Islands, Myanmar.173 
April 3–9 The 20th cycle of the INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted.174 
April 16–May 
6 
25th IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with INS 
Cheetah and one Indian Dornier, KRI Tjiptadi, and CN-235 
maritime patrol aircraft from the Indonesian side.175 
May 4–6 Port visit: The 25th IND-INDO CORPAT closing ceremony was 
held in Belawan, Indonesia.176 
May 18 Port visit: Indian ships arrived for IMDEX-15 and SIMBEX-15 
Singapore.177 
May 20 SIMBEX-15 was held in the South China Sea with INS Satpura, 
Kamorta, Ranvir, and Shakti and conducted PASSEXs with 
Indonesian, Thai, Cambodian, and Australian navies.178 
May 22–26 Port visit: Indian ships returned from SIMBEX-15 to participate in 
IMDEX-15 in the port of Singapore.179 
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May 24–28 Port visit: INS Saryu participated in the 3rd edition of the ASEAN 
ARF DiREx-15 in Penang, Malaysia. China, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
India were the participating countries. The maritime component of the 
ARF DiREx-15 included search and rescue from a simulated 
incident.180 
May 31–June 4 Port visit: INS Ranvir and INS Shakti visited Jakarta, Indonesia, as 
part of their eastern deployment.181 
June 17–20 Port visit: INS Satpura, Kamorta, Ranvir, and Shakti visited 
Kuantan, Malaysia, as part of their eastern deployment.182 
June 23–27 Port visit: INS Satpura and INS Shakti visited Sattahip, Thailand, as 
part of their eastern deployment.183 
June 23–27 Port visit: INS Ranvir and INS Kamorta visited Sihanoukville, 
Cambodia, as part of their eastern deployment.184 
October 1–3 Port visit: INS Saryu entered Port Belawan, Indonesia, for the 26th 
IND-INDO CORPAT opening ceremony.185 
October 3–21 26th IND-INDO EXPANDED CORPAT with the inaugural bilateral 
exercise element (October 17–18) embedded took place at their 
IMBL, while the bilateral exercise took place in the Andaman Sea. 
INS Saryu and one Indian Dornier as well as a warship and one 
maritime patrol craft from the Indonesian side participated.186 
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October 2–6 Port visit: INS Sahyadri visited Da Nang, Vietnam, on a four-day 
visit as part of operational deployment to the South China Sea and 
the Northwest Pacific region.187 
November 1–4 Port visit: INS Sahyadri visited Manila, Philippines, on a four-day 
visit as part of operational deployment to the South China Sea and 
the North West Pacific region.188 
November 14–
24 





The 4th IMCOR was conducted in the Andaman Sea along the IMBL 
with participation from INS Saryu, INS Bitra, UMS Aung Zeya, and 
fast attack craft (FAC) 563.190 The 4th IMCOR was significant in that 
the Indian navy and the MN signed a standard operating procedure for 
coordinated patrols during the closing ceremony, marking the third 
country that India has a formal agreement with for maritime 
coordinated patrols.191 
February 16 Port visit: The 4th IMCOR closing ceremony was held in Yangon, 
Myanmar.192 
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April 4–8 Port visit: INS Tir, INS Sujata, Sail Training Ship (STS) Sudarshini, 
and Indian Coast Guard Ship (ICGS) Varuna of the 1st Training 
Squadron visited Phuket, Thailand, as part of their overseas 
deployment.193 
April 10–15 Port visit and naval exercise: INS Sumedha and an Indian P8I 
aircraft participated in the multilateral naval exercise, KOMODO-16, 
as well as the IFR in Padang, Indonesia.194 
April 28–May 
19 
The 27th IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with 
participation from INS Karmuk, KRI Imam Bonjol, and a maritime 
patrol craft from both countries.195 
May 16–19 Port visit: The closing ceremony of the 27th IND-INDO CORPAT 
was held in Port Belawan, Indonesia.196 
April 19–27 The 22nd INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with 
participation from INS Karmuk, HTMS Klaeng, and a maritime 
patrol craft from both countries.197 
May 1 Port visit: INS Airavat arrived in Brunei for the ADMM+ Exercise 
on Maritime Security and Counter Terrorism.198 
May 1–9 INS Airavat participated alongside warships from Brunei, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
China, Japan, Russia, Australia, Republic of Korea, and the United 
States in the 2016 ADMM+ Exercise on Maritime Security and 
Counter Terrorism.199 
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May 9 Port visit: INS Airavat arrived in Singapore for closing ceremony for 
the ADMM+ Exercise on Maritime Security and Counter 
Terrorism.200 
May 30–June 2 Port visit: INS Sahyadri and INS Shakti visited Subic Bay, 
Philippines, as part of their deployment of the Eastern Fleet to the 
South China Sea and Western Pacific.201 
 
May 30-June 3 Port visit: INS Satpura and INS Kirch visited Cam Ranh Bay, 
Vietnam, as part of their deployment of the Eastern Fleet to the South 
China Sea and Western Pacific.202 
July 15–18 Port visit: INS Sahyadri, INS Kirch, and INS Shakti visited Port 
Klang, Malaysia, as part of their deployment of the Eastern Fleet to 
the South China Sea and Western Pacific.203 
August 31–
September 3 
Port visit: INS Satpura visited Singapore as part of their deployment 
of the Eastern Fleet to the South China Sea and Western Pacific.204 
October 10–12 Port visit: INS Sumitra visited Surabaya, Indonesia, as part of their 
deployment to the South Western Pacific Ocean. On departure, INS 
Sumitra undertook a PASSEX with Indonesian naval ships.205 
October 10–13 Opening ceremony for the 28th IND-INDO CORPAT was held at 
Port Belawan, Indonesia.206 
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October 13–27 The 28th IND-INDO CORPAT and second Bilateral Maritime 
Exercise was conducted at their IMBL with participation from INS 
Karmuk, KRI Wiratno, and a maritime patrol craft from both 
countries.207 
October 27–31 Port visit: INS Tir, INS Sujata, STS Sudarshini, and ICGS Varuna 
of the 1st Training Squadron visited Phuket, Thailand, as part of 
their overseas deployment.208 
October 31–
November 5 
SIMBEX-16 was held in the Bay of Bengal with INS Ranvijay, INS 
Kamorta, one Sindhugosh class submarine, RSS Formidable, and 
various aircraft. SIMBEX-16 focused on antisubmarine warfare.209 
November 2–6 Port visit: INS Tir, INS Sujata, STS Sudarshini, and ICGS Varuna 
of the 1st Training Squadron visited Yangon, Myanmar, as part of 
their overseas deployment.210 
November 18–
21 
The23rd INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with 
participation from INS Karmuk, HTMS Longlom, and a maritime 
patrol craft from both countries.211 
November 22–
25 
Port visit: The closing ceremony of the 23rd INDO-THAI CORPAT 




Port visit: INS Sumitra visited Jakarta, Indonesia, as part of its 
deployment to the South Western Pacific Ocean.213 
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March 12 Port visit: The 5th IMCOR opening ceremony was held in Yangon, 
Myanmar.214 
March 12–18 The 5th IMCOR was conducted in the Andaman Sea along the 
IMBL with participation from INS Karmuk, UMS Bangaram, and 
maritime patrol crafts.215 
March 20–26 Port visit: INS Kora participated in Langkawi International Maritime 
and Aerospace Exhibition in Langkawi, Malaysia.216 
April 13 The 24th INDO-THAI CORPAT opening ceremony was held in 
Phuket, Thailand.217 
April 13–21 The 24th INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with 
participation from INS Cheetah, HTMS Longlom, and a maritime 
patrol craft from both countries.218 
May 11–13 Port visit: INS Rajput visited Yangon, Myanmar, for an operational 
turnaround.219 
May 12–21 Port visit: INS Sahyadri and INS Kamorta visited Singapore to 
participate in the international maritime review and lMDEX-17.220 
                                                 
214 “INS Karmuk (MSL Corvette) and Bangaram (FAC) Enter Yangon for 5th Indo-Myanmar 
Coordinated Patrol CORPAT,” Asian Defence News, March 13, 2017, http://asian-defence-
news.blogspot.com/2017/03/ins-karmuk-msl-corvette-bangaramfac.html.  
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218 Ministry of Defence, Government of India.  
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May 18–24 SIMBEX-17 was held in the South China Sea with participation from 
INS Shivalik, INS Sahyadri, and INS Jyoti. INS Kamorta, RSN 
Supreme, RSN Formidable, RSN Victory, and various aircraft. 
SIMBEX-17 focused on antisubmarine warfare, integrated operations 
with surface, air and subsurface forces, air defense, and surface 
encounter exercises.221 
May 14–19 Port visit: INS Shivalik and INS Jyoti visit Kuantan, Malaysia, 
following SIMBEX-17.222 
May 9–22 The 29th IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with 
participation from INS Utkrosh, KRI Sutedi Senoputra, and a 
maritime patrol craft from both countries.223 
May 22–25 Port visit: The 29th IND-INDO CORPAT closing ceremony was 
held in Belawan, Indonesia.224 
May 26–30 Port visit: INS Sahyadri and INS Kamorta visited Jakarta, Indonesia, 
as part of their deployment to Southeast Asia and Southern Indian 
Ocean.225 
June 1–5 Port visit: INS Sahyadri and INS Kamorta visited Surabaya, 
Indonesia, as part of their deployment to Southeast Asia and 
Southern Indian Ocean.226 
June 6–8 Port visit: INS Sumitra visited Yangon, Myanmar, to provide relief 
assistance post cyclone Mora.227 
                                                 
221 “Bilateral Exercise between Indian and Republic of Singapore Navy SIMBEX-17 Commences,” 
Indian Navy, February 26, 2019, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/bilateral-exercise-between-indian-
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Port visit: INS Satpura and INS Kadmatt visited Singapore as their 




Port visit: INS Satpura and INS Kadmatt visited Haiphong, Vietnam, 
on their way to ASEAN’s IFR. The Indian navy preformed drills and 
conducted a PASSEX with the Vietnamese navy.229 
October 3–6 Port visit: INS Satpura and INS Kadmatt visited Manila, Philippines, 
as part of their deployment to ASEAN’s IFR.230 
October 3–12 Port visit: INS Tir, INS Sujata, INS Shardul, and ICGS Sarathi of 
the 1st Training Squadron visited Penang, Malaysia.231 
October 18–22 Port visit: INS Tir, INS Sujata, INS Shardul, and ICGS Sarathi of 
the 1st Training Squadron visited Jakarta, Indonesia.232 
October 3–
November 7 
Port visit: STS Sudarshini of the 1st Training Squadron visited 
Jakarta, Indonesia, as part of their voyage to train junior officers.233 
October 24 Port visit: The 30th IND-INDO CORPAT opening ceremony was held 
in Port Belawan, Indonesia.234 
October 24–
November 5 
The30th IND-INDO CORPAT and the embedded bilateral exercise 
was conducted at their IMBL with participation from INS Sukanya, 
KRI Imam Bonjal, and a maritime patrol craft from both 
countries.235 
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INS Satpura and INS Kadmatt visited Pattaya, Thailand, to represent 
India in ASEAN’s IFR. ASEAN’s IFR at Pattaya Bay commemorated 
the 50th anniversary of ASEAN.236 
November 27–
30 
Port visit: INS Kadmatt visited Sihanoukville, Cambodia, as part of 
their deployment to ASEAN’s IFR but also to commemorate 25 
years of India-ASEAN dialogue.237 
November 25–
28 
Port visit: INS Satpura visited Muara, Brunei, following ASEAN’s 
IFR in Thailand. Following the port visit, INS Satpura conducted a 
PASSEX with the Royal Brunei Navy.238 
November 30–
December 2 
Port visit: INS Kadmatt visited Belawan, Indonesia, following 
ASEAN’s IFR in Thailand as well as to commemorate 25 years of 
India-ASEAN dialogue.239 
December 2–5 Port visit: INS Kadmatt and INS Satpura visited Port Klang, 
Malaysia, as part of their deployment to ASEAN’s IFR. The navies 
conducted a PASSEX and a HADR exercise.240 
  
2018  
January 24–31 The 25th INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with 
participation from INS Saryu, HTMS Longlom, and a maritime patrol 
craft from both countries.241 
January 25 INS Sunayna undertook PASSEX with Singapore ship RSS 
Resolution off Kochi.242 
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67 
January 31 Port visit: The 25th INDO-THAI CORPAT closing ceremony was 
held in Phuket, Thailand.243 
March 6–13 MILAN-18 was conducted in the Andaman Sea with participation 
from the navies of Australia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, 
Myanmar, New Zealand, Oman, Vietnam, Thailand, Tanzania, Sri 
Lanka, Singapore, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, and Cambodia.244 
Some websites post participation from additional countries in the 
table top exercise portion. 
March 13–18 The 6th IMCOR was conducted in the Andaman Sea along the 
IMBL with participation from INS Kulish, INS Baratang, UMS King 
Sin Phyu Shin, UMS Inlay, and maritime patrol crafts.245 




The 1st edition of IMNEX was conducted in Visakhapatnam, India for 
the harbor phase. INS Sahyadri, INS Kamorta, Indian submarine 
Sindhushastra, UMS King Sin Phyu Shin, UMS Inlay, and various 
aircraft participated in the sea phase.247 
May 2–13 Port visit and exercise: INS Airavat participated along 18 other 
navies at ADMM+ Maritime Security and Counter-Terrorism 
Exercise in Singapore.248 
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244 Prashanth Parameswaran, “The Real Significance of India’s MILAN Navy Exercise,” Diplomat, 
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May 6–8 Port visit: INS Sahyadri, INS Shakti, and INS Kamorta visited 
Singapore as part of their overseas deployment to Southeast Asia.249 
May 13–17 Port visit: INS Sahyadri and INS Shakti visited Sattahip, Thailand, as 
part of their overseas deployment to Southeast Asia.250 
May 14–17 Port visit: INS Kamorta visited Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, as part of 
its overseas deployment to Southeast Asia.251 
May 21–25 Port visit: INS Sahyadri, INS Shakti, INS Kamorta visited Da Nang, 
Vietnam, as part of their overseas deployment to Southeast Asia.252 
Some sources claim this was the first naval exercise between the two 
countries, but little has been revealed.253 
May 24–June 2 The 31st IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted at IMBL with 
participation from INS Kulish, a KRI vessel, and a maritime patrol 
craft from both countries.254 
June 2 Port visit: INS Satpura visited Singapore as part of its overseas 
deployment to Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
boarded INS Satpura in Singapore while visiting Singapore to 
deepen ties.255 
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June 6–9 Port visit: The 31st IND-INDO CORPAT closing ceremony was 
held in Belawan, Indonesia.256 
June 16–22 The 26th INDO-THAI CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with 
participation from INS Utkrosh, HTMS Longlom, and a maritime 
patrol craft from both countries.257 
June 24–26 Port visit: INS Shakti and INS Kamorta visited Makassar, Indonesia, 
as part of their overseas deployment to Southeast Asia.258 
July 11 Port visit: INS Sumitra visited Sabang, Indonesia, for an operational 
turnaround. This was the first port visit by an Indian naval ship to 
Sabang. Both countries agreed that India would develop the Sabang 
port.259 




Port visits: INS Tir, INS Sujata, INS Sudarshini, INS Shardul, and 
ICGS Sarathi deployed in Southeast Asia as part of training 
deployment and visited Lumut, Malaysia, Singapore, and Jakarta, 
Indonesia. During the deployment, INS Tir, INS Sujata, and INS 
Shardul were diverted to Indonesia to provide relief assistance to 
Sulawesi following a tsunami.261 
September 26 Port visit: The 7th IMCOR opening ceremony was held in Yangon, 
Myanmar.262 
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The 7th IMCOR was conducted in the Andaman Sea along the 
IMBL with participation from INS Kulish, INS Battimalv, a UMS 
vessel, and maritime patrol crafts.263 
September 27–
30 
Port visit: INS Rana visited Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, on its way 
to IFR in South Korea.264 
September 30 Port visit: The 7th IMCOR closing ceremony was held at Coco 
Island, Myanmar.265 
October 11 Port visit: The 32nd IND-INDO CORPAT opening ceremony was 
held in Belawan, Indonesia.266 
October 11–27 The 32nd IND-INDO CORPAT was conducted at their IMBL with 
participation from INS Kulish, KRI Kapitan Pattimaru, and a 
maritime patrol craft from both countries.267 
November 12–
15 
Port visit: INS Rana visited Surabya, Indonesia, for the harbor phase 
of the inaugural bilateral exercise entitled Samudra Shakti.268 
November 16–
18 
The inaugural bilateral exercise, Samudra Shakti, sea phase, saw 
participation from INS Rana, KRI Sultan Iskandar Muda, and various 
aircraft and conducted helicopter operations, a surface warfare 
exercise, an antisubmarine exercise, and antipiracy exercises.269 
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SIMBEX-18 was held in the Bay of Bengal and was the largest 
SIMBEX ever conducted. INS Ranvijay, INS Satpura, INS Sahyadri, 
INS Kadmatt, INS Kirch, INS Sumedha, INS Sukanya, INS Shakti, 
INS Sindhukirti (submarine), and various Indian naval aircraft 
represented the Indian participation. RSS Formidable, RSS Steadfast, 
RSS Unity, RSS Vigour, RSS Valiant, RSS Swordsman (submarine), 
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